STRATEGY FOR CHILD CUSTODY SUITS
INVOLVING CONFLICT OF LAWS
RAY GRAVES*

Suppose H and W, married and domiciled in North Carolina, secure a divorce by decree of a North Carolina court
and W is awarded custody of the only minor child. W then
moves to Virginia and acquires a new domicile there. H
now finds that W is living an immoral life -in Virginia and
desires to secure custody of the child. The question immediately arises: Where may a suit to secure such change
of custody be brought, and where will it be more effectivein a Virginia or a North Carolina court? The choice may
bear considerably on the length of time it will take, the cost
of the litigation, and the number of courts the aggrieved
party must go through to reach the desired results. A lawyer with this problem would necessarily direct his thoughts
first to the requirements of jurisdiction in suits for custody,
keeping in mind that various states follow different jurisdictional rules. These rules are:1 (a) that domicile of the
child is the sole basis of jurisdiction, (b) that physical presence of the child in the state is necessary, (c) that physical
presence of the spouses is sufficient irrespective of where
the child is, (d) that jurisdiction, once having attached, is
continuing, regardless of the domicile or whereabouts of
the parties, and (e.) that no hard and fast rule is to be
applied, but that any of these bases might serve depending
upon the circumstances of the particular case. The last
mentioned theory presupposes that, while there may be a
concurrent jurisdiction in two or more states, a sound discretion on the part of the courts will be exercised in disposing of the particular case.
Special mention should be made of the last "rule" for it
has received closest attention and has gathered a sizeable
* 3rd year law student, Duke University; A.B. Washington State College 1950.
1 See Note, 9 A.L.R.2d 434 (1949).
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following over the past few years. 2 I shall advert to it
occasionally for an appraisal of whether it has provided a
more satisfactory solution than prior rules.
Since the last significant writing in this field, 3 an ever increasing number of cases involving some phase of this problem has come before the appellate courts of the several states.
This article purports to deal with the end results accomplished by the actual application of one or more of the several bases of jurisdiction to a particular set of facts. Most
of the cases that have arisen in the past few years with
factual and legal problems allied to those in the hypothetical
case have been traced to their ultimate disposition by correspondence with the attorneys in those cases. I propose to
analyze the applications of the various rules by answering
a series of questions suggested by the cases surveyed. Further the correspondence with the attorneys was had in
cases where the child was outside the state of forum; the
remainder of the cases are taken directly from the reports.
While the survey indicates that generally lawyers and
courts alike are at loss for solutions in particular cases and
feel a need for revision in this field of the law, 4 is has also
revealed that wherever practical suits for custody or change
of custody should be brought in the state where the
child is physically present, regardless of domicile. In nearly
all the cases where suit was brought in a state other than
that where the child was physically present and where the
decree was adverse to the controlling spouse, such spouse
- See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948);
Ex parte Kosh, 233 P.2d 598 (Calif. 1951); Helton v. Crawley, 241 Ia.
296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel. Camp v. Camp, 150 Pa.
Super. 649, 29 A.2d 363 (1942); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E.
624 (1925).
Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10
Law. & Contemp. Prob. 819 (1944).
1 In Daugherty v. Nelson, 234 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. App. 1950) the court
said: "Several theories have been developed to determine the correct
basis of jurisdiction to award custody of a minor child, as a consequence the cases dealing with the question are in considerable confusion."
1 The exceptions to this proposition are those cases where the controlling spouse is in the state and can be effectively controlled. See
discussion, infra p. 18.
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refused to voluntarily return the child to the party awarded

custody. 6 This fact has generally resulted in resort to the
courts of a second or third state by the winning spouse, 7 a

compromise between the spouses,8 or resort to selp-help to
secure the child.9

Often of course financial considerations

have prevented any further action.'0
Aside from the constitutional problem involved in assuming jurisdiction without the domicile of the child being in
the state of the forum, sound argument can be made for the
assumption of jurisdiction on the basis of physical presence.

The court has the child before it and can render an effective
decree; often the state in which the child is physically pres-

ent will have a greater interest in the welfare of the child
and the preservation of the family unit than the state in

which the child is technically domiciled.

Further, as has

been indicated, the parties most often find it necessary in

the end to resort to the courts of such state regardless of
where the original action was brought. So direct move into

those courts will often save the client money as well as
prolonged litigation.

As between physical presence and

0 Little v. Little, 249 Ala. 144, 30 So.2d 386 (1947); Roberts v. Roberts, 300 Ky. 454, 189 S.W.2d 691 (1945); Conley v. Conley, 324 Mass.
530, 87 N.E.2d 153 (1949); Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218
S.W.2d 566 (1949); Hughes v. Hughes, 180 Ore. 575, 178 P.2d 170 (1947);
Commonwealth cx rel. Camp v. Camp, 150 Pa.Super. 649, 29 A.2d 863
(1942) (the child returned but afterward taken and not since found);
Clothier v. Clothier, 232 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1950); Mills v. Howard, 228
S.W.2d 906 (Tex. 1950); Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 194 S.W. 2d
551 (1946); Kern v. Linsey, 182 Va. 775, 30 S.E. 2d 707 (1944); Clifton
v. Clifton [1949) 1 D.L.R. 597 (Br. Col.). In a few cases the child
must have been returned voluntarily, but special circumstances may
account for this. Coats v. Coats, 161 Kan. 307, 167 P.2d 290 (1946);
Lotz v. Lotz, 327 Mich. 577, 42 N.W.2d 745 (1950) (child to be returned
from California in July each year to Michigan-H to pay expenses for
W and child). Information has been obtained in part from attorneys
in the above cases.
7 Hughes v. Hughes, supra, note 6; Little v. Little, supra, note 6; Boor
v. Boor, 241 Ia. 973, 43 N.W.2d 155 (1950), to cite only a few.
8 Clothier v. Clothier, supra, note 6; Peacock v. Bradshaw, supra,
note 6.
o Commonwealth ex reZ. Camp v. Camp, supra, note 6 (parties armed
only with letter from judge); Mills v. Howard, supra note 6; Clifton v.
Clifton, supra, note 6.
10 Conley v. Conley, 324 Mass. 530, 87 N.E.2d 153 (1949) (ltr from attorney L. H. Miller, Brockton, Mass.)
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domicile as a sole choice for jurisdictional grounds (where
the two do not concur), it is thought the better argument
can generally be made in favor of physical presence.
For a closer view, the results of the survey have been
divided into the particular problems presented. The division is necessarily somewhat artificial since the problems
overlap to varying degrees.
L What are the results when a court accepts jurisdiction
on the ground of domicile when the child is out of the state?
In Sampsell v. Superior Court," H, W and child lived in
Los Angeles county until 1946 when W and child went to
Nevada. W there obtained a divorce and was awarded
custody of the child in 1947. She then moved to Utah and
was there remarried. H in the meantime had petitioned
the Los Angeles county court for divorce and custody of
the child claiming inter alia that W had secured divorce in
Nevada by fraudulently representing that she was domiciled
there. 12 Respondent court refused to proceed, basing its
refusal on jurisdictional grounds. Upon H's petition, a
mandamus was issued ordering the exercise of jurisdiction
as to the custody on the ground that physical presence of
the child was not necessary and that following the "concurrent jurisdiction" view, the court might take jurisdiction
on the basis of domicile. Prior to the decision by the California Supreme Court, H filed suit in a Utah county court
and was awarded custody during the summer months of each
year. On appeal the decision was affirmed by the Utah
Supreme Court.' 3
Following the view adopted by the California Supreme
Court, H might have brought suit in any of three statesCalifornia, as the state of domicile; Nevada, which had a
continuing jurisdiction (assuming it originally had juris32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
2 The California court determined both were domiciled In California.
But the court rejected
" Sampsell v. Holt, 202 P.2d 550 (Utah 1949).
the idea that the lower court could modify the Nevada decree and preferred to rest its affirmance on "changed circumstances"-here passage
of time. Proceedings on the mandamus to the Los Angeles county court
were dismissed after this decision.
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diction) ; and Utah because the child and controlling spouse
were physically present there. 14In fact H did go through
the chain of courts in two states.
On the surface, it appears H's lawyers would have been
vise to resort directly to the Utah courts. The question
then is: What advantage, if any, lies in bringing suit in
either of the Qther two states? The case suggests three
possible answers: (1) a decree of a California or Nevada
court of recent date might have been a powerful weapon in
.the hands of the plaintiff in the Utah courts ;15 (2) by this
delayed action in arriving at the court of final disposition
H has secured a passage of time which may supply the
needed "change of circumstances"; and (3) a suit in the
California courts might be more convenient from both a
working and financial standpoint.
As to the second answer, the further question suggests
itself: Why bring suit to gain passage of time when nonaction might achieve the same result? Several answers
might be given, viz. that it is action that may satisfy the
client (he knows his lawyer is doing something), and at
the same time there is a possible chance of a decree in the
plaintiff's favor. As between the home court and a foreign
court, the former is more likely to favor the plaintiff.1 6
Then too, the defendant occasionally returns the child voluntarily.
While the plaintiff in the Sampsell case succeeded in securing a change in a previous award of custody, would the
11It

is suggested H would also have gone through the Nevada courts
and at least one more California court if suit had not been filed in Utah
when it was, unless upon the first award of custody W voluntarily returned the child to H. This is rarely the case. The reason for the suggestion is that neither California or Nevada would have been able to
enforce their decrees in Utah. For frank admissions that such decrees
are unenforceable see: Weber v. Weber, 10 Alaska 214 (1942) and Peacock v. Bradshaw, supra, note 6.
iSince full faith and credit may be given. If the decree is not of
recent date there will have been time for changed circumstances to have
taken place. In Moloney v. Moloney, 167 Kan. 444, 206 P.2d 1076 (1949)
twenty-four days was sufficient time for changed circumstances.
20 That this is often the case, see: In re Brown, 90 Cal.App.2d 651, 203
P.2d 799 (1949) where the parties brought suits in different states at
approximately the same time and both received awards of custody.
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same strategy be desirable in a case where a decree of custody is sought for the first time? In this respect consider
Beckman v. Beckman.' 7 In that case H suddenly and unexpectedly departed Missouri, the state of domicile, taking the
children with him and settled down in California. W sued
for divorce and custody in Missouri. H appeared only
specially to contest the jurisdiction. The court awarded
custody to W, and the decree was affirmed by the Missouri
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, W did not get the children
for H refused to send them back. W has not pursued here
remedies in the California courts. The final result suggests
W has gained little by the Missouri decree and its affirmance; further prosecution is necessary for effective results.
Perhaps the more effective way would have been for W to
bring habeas corpus in a California court immediately following the Missouri lower court's decree ;18 if not direct resort to the California courts in the first instance. If the
direct method had been used and suit brought before H
had a chance to settle down, such suit might have resulted
in a decree for plaintiff because of the circumstances under
which the children were taken. 9 If the problem is a financial
one this would certainly be the best step and plaintiff can
defend in forma pcauperis if the defendant appeals the first
decree. 20 Possibly then, while in the Sampsell type case
(where one party has already been awarded custody) resort
to the state of domicile may sometimes be desirable, it may
be disastrous in such cases as Beckman for financial or other
17358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (1949).
28 This was the method used in Hughes v. Hughes, supra, note 6, and
Little v. Little, supra, note 6.
19 Crocker v. Crocker, 219 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1950).
But cf. Helton v.
Crawley 241 Ia. 290, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950).
^ Some states so provide by statute. UTAH CODE ANNo. 1943, §28-7-3,
reads: "Any person may institute, prosecute, defend, and appeal any
cause in any court in this state by taking and subscribing, before any
officer authorized to administer an oath, the following . . . .". §28-7-4
provides that no fees shall be paid. Probably no statute is needed and
a court may in its discretion order payment of paupers costs. Williams
v. Wilkins, 3 Johns Ch. 65 (N.Y. 1817). There is also the possibility
of legal aid. There are many established legal aid clinics in the larger
cities as well as committees in state bar organizations.
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17

reasons. The recommended strategy would seem to be to
prosecute in the courts of the state where the child is no
later than after the first award of custody in the home state.
This is especially true since where the plaintiff wins in his
home court, the defendant will generally appeal on grounds
of jurisdiction to secure a passage of time and give the
child a chance to get familiar with his new surroundings so
that when the plaintiff finally gets to the state where the
child is, the defendant can plead "changed circumstances".
The method suggested may prevent defendant's strategy
from being effective.
It must be emphasized that the above recommendations
would not be applicable where the defendant has fled to a
state that will not assume jurisdiction except on the basis
of domicile. 21 In these cases the best plan is to secure a
decree of custody in the domiciliary state and afterward
bring habeas corpus or other proper remedy in the state
fled to. A recent case in a state accepting no other basis
than domicile indicates the results to be expected. In
Alman v. Register,22 H and W were divorced in Henrico
County, Virginia, in 1947 and the court then awarded W
custody of the child during the school year and to H during
the summer months. After the summer of 1950 the father
living in North Carolina, refused to return the child to
Virginia and W brought habeas corpus in Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina. That court granted a change of
custody in H's favor. On appeal the decision was reversed
by the Supreme Court because it was said the lower court
was without jurisdiction since the child was not domiciled
in North Carolina. On remand, the county court, in accordance with the opinion of the Supreme Court, ordered the
23
child returned to its mother in Virginia.
2 Jurisdiction is used here in the sense of power to make a decree
regarding status of the child. This point is well discussed in Stansbury, Custody and Maintainence Law Across State Lines, 10 L.& C.P. 819,
825 (1944).
233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951).
By judgment dated 11 June 1951, #43-176.
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H. What are the results where the suit Is brought in a state
where one or both spouses are present and
the child is absentl
In this type of case, if the court has the controlling spouse
before it, measures can be taken to insure return of the
child if the decree is adverse to such party. Such measures
may include sequestration of the defendant's property in the
state,2 4 modification of former alimony decrees, 25 and requiring the defendant to post a bond to insure return of the
26
child.
If the court in which such action is brought requires
physical presence of the child and accepts no other basis,
it would seem the court would not take such a case. On
the other hand, if the child is domiciled in the state, those
courts basing jurisdiction on either domicile, physical presence of the spouses, or the view of "concurrent jurisdiction"
would seem to encounter no difficulties.
Often the court has little knowledge of or interest in the
child and frankly admits this, yet without too much hesitation proceeds to award custody. 27 This type of situation
occurs where the parties go to another state for a divorce
and leave the child behind with friends or relatives. But
in many cases the court does have such knowledge and interest, for example cases where the spouses have thought
it desirable to take the child out of the state until
the marital trouble was over, or purely to escape the effect
that is easily predictable of being against them.28 Here
21 Turney v. Nooney, 9 N.J.Super. 333, 74 A.2d 356 (1950). See also:
Commonwealth ex rel v. Rahal, 48 Pa. D. & C. 568 (1937) (attachment
threatened).
- Levell v. Levell, 183 Ore. 39, 190 P.2d 527 (1948). See also: Coats
v. Coats, 161 Kan. 307, 167 P.2d 290 (1946).
Ex parte Halvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1945) affirmed 269
App.Div. 1019, 59 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1945) aff'd sub nous People ex rel. Halvey
v. Halvey 295 N.Y. 836, 66 N.E.2d 851 (1946), affirmed on other grounds
330 U.S. 610 (1947).
2 Wilson v. Wilson, 212 P.2d 1066 (Nev. 1949). New York refused to
give effect to such a custody award of a Cuban court. Quintana v. Quin.
tana, 101 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1950).
'

See: Commonwealth ex re7. v. Rahal, supra, note 24, and Fagan v,

Fagan, 1931 Conn. 688, 42 A.2d 41 (1945).
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the court is generally in an advantageous position to force
the party to bring the child within the state and when .it has
taken such action it has been effective.
In the latter type case it would seem the state's interest
in the child's welfare is such that the court should make the
custody award. This would not be true where it is the
spouses who go out of the state rather than the child.
I. What are the results where the child and one or both
spouses are out of state but the court accepts jurisdiction because it made the original award of custody and
deems itself to have a continuing jurisdiction?
It goes without saying, the problem here is to a large
extent like that of taking jurisdiction because of domicile
where the child and one of the spouses are out of the state.
A case worthy of examination as indicating likely results
is Hughes v. Hughes. 29 In that case H and W were divorced
by decree of the Multanomah County Court in Oregon in
1938 and W was then awarded custody of the child. H,
feeling circumstances had changed, desired to secure custody of the child during the summer months. H was then
domiciled in Washington and W in California. The problem is where to file the suit. The temptation is to say California. Under the "concurrent jurisdiction" view either of
two would have been proper. In the actual case modification
of the decree was sought in the court making the original
award and that court granted H part time custody. Defendant appealed, and prior to the final decision by the Supreme
Court, plaintiff filed suit in the county in California where
the child was. That court adopted the decree of the Oregon
court as modified and afterward affirmed. The case suggests that whether one goes to the courts having continuing
jurisdiction or not, he will finally end up in the courts of
the state where the child is. Even here, the defendant by
fleeing to a third state which might also consider itself to
- 180 Ore. 575, 178 P.2d 170 (1947).
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have jurisdiction, may finally win, and often has won othe inevitable result of allowing the child's presence to confer jurisdiction.
Occasionally though, the court has means to effectively
control the absent spouse and child. •Such a case is Leveli
v. Levell,31 where the court had originally made an award
of alimony to the party given the child and threatened to
cut off such alimony unless she heeded the court's orders.
When the spouse granted custody has changed domicile,
the new domiciliary state will sometimes deny the jurisdiction of the court claiming continuing jurisdiction and refuse
to give extraterritorial effect to any modification by that
court.3 2 Only those states recognizing domicile or physical
presence of the child as the sole jurisdictional basis would
be in this category. Those states taking the "concurrent
jurisdiction" view would not be.
Here again, attention should be drawn to the fact that by
going to the state having continuing jurisdiction, the plaintiff in the Hughes case secured himself a powerful weapon.
Theoretically, the decree in both Oregon and California
would have been the same-based on what the child's welfare demanded. Actually the reverse is often true and the
plaintiff will get a more favorable xeception outside the defendant's home state.8 3 The most undesirable feature is
that the plaintiff has secured his weapon in the state which
now has the least interest in the welfare of the child.
The court has a more difficult task when plaintiff has
secured his "weapon" in the form of a modification by a
foreign court. An Ohio court,3 4 while recognizing that the
foreign (Belgian) court had acted on the basis of continuing jurisdiction, nevertheless refused to give its decree
10Little v. Little, 249 Ala. 144, 30 So.2d 386 (1947) with the final
chapter written in Little v. Franklin, 40 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1949) (ltr from
Chason & Stone, Bay ilinette, Ala.); Boor v. Boor, 241 Ia. 973, 43 N.W.2d
155 (1950).
Supra, note 25.
McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945) and Moss
v. Ingram, 246 Ala. 214, 20 So.2d 202 (1944) (ignoring a decree of the
Mississippi court made while the child was there).
= See discussion, supra, note 16.
31 In re Vanderborght, 91 N.E.2d 47 (Cuyahoga Com. PI.,O. 1950).
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effect, because it was said, if service of process in the modification proceedings had been made in Ohio it would have
been invalid and have conferred no jurisdiction. It is
doubtful if this rationale would stand close analysis for the
Belgian court already had continuing jurisdiction and did
not need it conferred by service of process. This seems to
be the first time the courts have been troubled with such a
problem.
IV. What are the results where the child is physically
present in the state where proceedings are broughtT
Many states, perhaps the numerical majority, will accept
physical presence of the child as adequate grounds for jurisdiction. A few regard this as the sole basis.3 5 Many of the
results to be expected here have already been indicated, and
as suggested earlier, whenever practical suit should ordinarily be brought in the state where the child is physically
present. However careful planning on the part of the attorney is necessary. The attorney should try to learn the
jurisdictional grounds in the domiciliary state, and in the
state where the child is, what weight the latter state will
give to decrees of his client's state and to the fact that the
defendant fled the first state, and how prone the courts of
the second state are to find "changed circumstances".
In those states accepting physical presence of the child
as sufficient grounds for assuming jurisdiction, the usual
holding is that full faith and credit will be given to the decrees of other states,36 and that as to facts occurring before
7 There
the date of the foreign decree, they are res judicata.8
appears to be a wide split on the last question, some courts
holding that such decrees are only res judicata as to facts
m See for example Boor v. Boor, 241 Ia. 973, 43 N.W.2d 155 (1950)
(defendant fled two or three days before institution of proceedings in
Indiana. The Iowa court said the Indiana court was without jurisdiction
to award custody to the plaintiff because the child was in Iowa at the
time of judgment).
0 See: Scott v. Scott, 227 Ind. 396, 86 N.E.2d 533 (1949); STUMBEBG,
CONFLCT oF LAws 327 (2d ed. 1951).
17 McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945); Lofts v.
Lofts, 222 S.W.2d 101 (Mo.App. 1949).
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before the court at the time of judgment. 38 It would seem
if the foreign court so considers its own decrees, then a like
consideration would prevail where the child is.3m As to facts
subsequent to the foreign decree, a determination on the
merits is made, and if "changed circumstances" indicate it
desirable the court will change the custody. In other words,
the mere fact of "concurrent jurisdiction" does not generally mean a redetermination of all the facts.
More complications enter the picture where both spouses
file suits in different states at approximately the same time
and the courts award custody to opposite parties. In one
such case the California Supreme court held 40 that.the decree
of the other state (Nevada) would govern because it was
made several days earlier, and when Nevada handed down
its decree the parties were then divorced and the later California decree of divorce was inoperative, and since the custody award was merely incidental thereto and did not purport to be a modification of the earlier Nevada decree, it
would also be ineffective. If those were the real reasons
the moral for the attorney might be to file his petition in
the court having the shortest docket. Actually, the court
was probably adhering to that salutary policy of using the
judicial discretion which is part and parcel of the "concurrent jurisdiction" theory adopted in the SampselZ case. A
realistic view of the case seems to force the conclusion that
California was the state having the greater interest in the
family unit and the child's welfare-Nevada's only interest
was gained through six weeks residence of the wife in that
state. Other things being equal, the tenor of the courts
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 251 Ala. 645, 38 So.2d 853 (1949).
The
court there said: "Such changed conditions to which the authorities
refer is not necessarily confined to subsequent events but may Include
matter that was discovered though not disclosed when the original decree was entered." Accord: Bx parte State ex rel. McLaughlin, 35 So.2d
507 (Ala. 1948). But c. Dotsch v. Grimes, 171 P.2d 506 (Cal.App.2d
1946) (holding that a showing of changed circumstances was not necessary since the welfare of the child was paramount) and Application
of Reed, 152 Nebr. 819, 43 N.W.2d 161 (1950) to same effect.
c See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944) and Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610 (1947).
10In re Brown, 90 Cal.App.2d 651, 203 P.2d 799 (1949).
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opinion seems to indicate it would be in order for H to seek
modification of the decree after a reasonable amount of
time.
If there are no prior decrees before the court, and the
child is present in the state, little trouble is to be anticipated, unless* the state is one that rejects all grounds of
jurisdiction except domicile.
V. Problems of "double" and "shifting" domicile.
Decrees containing part-time custody awards to each of
the spouses often give rise to later controversies over the
child's domicile. Suppose that H, domiciled in Texas, has
been awarded custody of the child for three months, and W,
domiciled in Oklahoma, has been awarded custody the other
nine months of each year. Does the child's domicile shift
back and forth as the change of custody takes place, i.e.
does he have a "double domicile"? If so, does the domicile
change when the child should have been transferred? Such
is the holding of some courts. 41 The consequence is that
when the child is with H in Texas, H can seek a change of
custody even though Texas requires domicile for jurisdiction. And though H holds the child longer than the three
months period (so that if he wins, he will not have to hunt
for the child), W can also bring suit in Oklahoma, though
that state also requires domicile, since the child now belongs
in Oklahoma. Though this rule is of no importance in a
case where the two states will accept jurisdiction on the
basis of the child's physical presence, it definitely provides
a method of securing a change of custody in the most favorable court where both states require or accept domicile as
a basis. But rather than holding the child beyond the custody period and seeking the change when the other parent
brings habeas corpus, the petition must be brought within
the custody period, else domicile has again shifted. This
might have been the strategy in Allman v. Register, supra.
Still another situation arises where H and W are domiciled in different states and the controlling spouse dies.
Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. 1950); Ex Parte Miller, 201
Okla. 499, 207 P.2d 290 (1949).
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Suppose for example W, who has been awarded custody
of the child is now domiciled in New Mexico where she lives
with her parents, and H is still domiciled in Texas, the state
where the original award was made. If W dies, where is
the child domiciled? The answer given by one court is, that
upon the death of W, the child's domicile would automatic42
ally shift back to the state of the father's domicile.
In both types of cases one of the two states will generally
have a continuing jurisdiction and would not need to depend upon domicile. Yet there is a noticeable lack of discussion of continuing jurisdiction in the cases-probably
because the lawyers have not pushed the point.
It mightobe noted here that the whole jurisdictional problem is not peculiar to the United States and the Canadians
43
at least have fared little better than we.
Conclusions and recommendations.
The answer to the many problems suggested seems to lie
in a narrower and more uniform basis of jurisdiction. It
does not seem to be in the expanded concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction." The conclusions to be drawn from the present state of the law indicate that that concept calls for a
discretion which the courts have not often exercised. In
fact it offered little change in the former state of the lawit merely provided that instead of some states recognizing
domicile, some physical presence of the child or spouses, all
states would recognize all bases. Its end result, if uniformly adopted, would be that fleeing parties would never go
into a state that would send them home for lack of jurisdiction. Certainly, if the child's welfare is the paramount
consideration, some stability in the law over and above what
that concept offers would seem desirable.

11Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 194 S.W.2d 551 (1946); Note,
136 A.L.R. 914 (1942).
43 Clifton v. Clifton [1949] 1 D.L.R. 597 (the court awarded H custody
of the child who was domiciled in British Columbia but living in Alberta
with its mother. H secured the child by self-help after W refused to
return him voluntarily). But cf. Cleaver v. Cleaver [19491 4 D.L.R. 367,
where the Ontario court refused to take jurisdiction where the child
was out of the province. McKee v. McKee [1951] 1 All Eng. Rep. 942 is
the most recent authority for the Canadians.
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It is somewhat doubtful that all the jurisdictional bases
presently used are constitutional, and the United States
Supreme Court has consistently refused to meet the problem. The task lies with the state legislatures or Congress
to provide some sound and uniform basis within the limits
of the constitution.
If the basis is to be narrower and more uniform, there
are several possibilities; e.g. any one of the several bases
used at present might provide the framework for uniform
state laws. The federal government might enact legislation
of two types: (a) for the enforcement of uniform state laws
in the federal courts or (b) for federal rules of law to govern those who use the channels of interstate commerce to
flee with children.
If federal legislation is desired, it is thought the best
method would be for congress to make the state uniform
laws enforceable in the federal courts with provisions for
removal. Such an exercise of the federal power could
easily be sustained under the commerce clause as within
the principle of such cases as In re Rahrer4 4 and ClarkDistilling Company v. Western Maryland R. Co. 45 An act similar
to the Webb-Kenyon Act 46 would be adequate. For cases of
"double domitile" where the spouses are domiciled in different states, Congress might well act under the diversity
of citizenship provisions of the constitution. 47 Use of the
federal courts under this provision could be accomplished
by dropping the statutory jurisdictional sum necessary to
institute civil proceedings.
Should Congress desire to enact the rules of law in the
first instance, it might also do this as an exercise of the
commerce power.4 8 As precedent for the subject matter we
49
might look to the Federal Kidnaping Act.
If the states are to enact the uniform legislation, then
whatever the course of action desired, we must look first
"

140 U.S. 545 (1891).

I' 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
37 STAT. 699 (1913).
U.S. CONST. ART. III, §2.
,8 U.S. CONST. ART. I, §8.
11 18 U.S.C. §408a (1934).
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for the possibilities for jurisdictional basis open under the
present state of constitutional law.
The only case in which the Supreme Court has given
much consideration to the problem is Halvey v. Halvey.- 0
The court there expressly left open the question of jurisdiction to award custody. When that case was before the
Florida court the child was neither in the state at the time
of the decree nor would it appear he was domiciled in Florida, though he was there when proceedings were begun. Mr.
Justice Jackson specially concurred on the ground that the
Florida court had no jurisdiction to award custody. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in a special concurring opinion, indicated that he too doubted the jurisdiction of the Florida
Court. His words were:
'The child's welfare must be the controlling consideration whenever a court which can actually lay
hold of a child is appealed to on behalf of the child.
Short of that, a valid custodial decree by Florida
could not be set aside simply because a New York
court, on independent consideration, has its own
view, of what custody would be appropriate."
These words suggest that jurisdiction on grounds of
physical presence would be appropriate. Perhaps either
domicile or physical presence would satisfy Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's views. Because of the considerations involved, it is doubtful the court would require the domicile necessary in divorce cases.
Let us briefly consider which of the possible bases would
be most desirable. Would a uniform acceptance of domicile
present many situations where its application would run
against the welfare of the child or the inherent rights of
the parents? Should one of the spouses go to another state
with the child before any award of custody was made, the
other spouse would proceed in the domiciliary state, and
upon securing a decree of custody, would bring a petition
for habeas corpus in the second state. Since that state is
also applying the domicile rule, it would refuse to hear the
w330 U.S. 610 (1947).
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case on the merits and order the child returned to the domiciliary state as in Allman v. Register. If the fleeing spouse
has lived in the second state long enough to have acquired
domicile then the original suit may have to be brought in
the second state, depending on whose domicile the child has
-H's or W's. Against the rule of domicile it must be said
that often the parties cannot be found until a new domicile
has been established and there is still the inconvenience of
resorting to another state. The problem of ascertaining
the state of the child's domicile will be a difficult one.. Often
the parties will not have lived in the state of domicile for
several years and that state actually may have little interest
in their welfare. While a uniform basis of domicile would
not be a cure-all, it would make it more difficult, not to flee,
but to avoid the effects of an adverse decree. At present
many courts frankly refuse to give any weight to the fact
that a party has fled a second state in violation of a court
decree.5 1
For reasons already mentioned the wisdom of a uniform
adoption of physical presence of the child as the basis is
thought to be unsound. The possibilities open to the losing
party to flee from state to state until a decree in his favor
is obtained are too great. There is however something to
be said in favor of this basis. The state will often be able
to enforce its decree and in many cases where the child is
more than a mere passer-by the court's interest will be
greater than that of a court in the domiciliary state.
It is suggested that the adoption of a uniform state law
providing for some sort of residence as the basis of jurisdiction would be the most desirable. Call it domicile if you
will-with the period of time comparable to Nevada's divorce provisions. Such a basis would require something
less than what is ordinarily necessary to establish domicile
and yet something more than physical presence. This would
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement imposed by the federal constitution unless the state must take jurisdiction
when the child is physically present. The situation created
See note 19, supra.
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would be closer to the ideal, for the court where the parties
have last spent any amount of time will be considering the
problem and as a consequence the court will have before it
the facts. A flight a few days prior to institution of proceedings would not defeat jurisdiction; another state would
not make a new determination where the flight is after institution of proceedings but would on petition of habeas
corpus order the child returned to the state fled.

